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Appropriate social problem solving constitutes a critical skill for individuals and may rely on
processes important for self-generated thought (SGT). The aim of the current study was
to investigate the link between SGT and social problem solving. Using the Means-End
Problem Solving task (MEPS), we assessed participants’ abilities to resolve daily social
problems in terms of overall efficiency and number of relevant means they provided to
reach the given solution. Participants also performed a non-demanding choice reaction
time task (CRT) and a moderately-demanding working memory task (WM) as a context
in which to measure their SGT (assessed via thought sampling). We found that although
overall SGT was associated with lower MEPS efficiency, it was also associated with higher
relevant means, perhaps because both depend on the capacity to generate cognition that
is independent from the hear and now. The specific content of SGT did not differentially
predict individual differences in social problem solving, suggesting that the relationship
may depend on SGT regardless of its content. In addition, we also found that performance
at the WM but not the CRT was linked to overall better MEPS performance, suggesting
that individuals good at social processing are also distinguished by their capacity to
constrain attention to an external task. Our results provide novel evidence that the capacity
for SGT is implicated in the process by which solutions to social problems are generated,
although optimal problem solving may be achieved by individuals who display a suitable
balance between SGT and cognition derived from perceptual input.
Keywords: self-generated thought, mind-wandering, social problem-solving, thought content, task performance
and analysis
INTRODUCTION
The social world poses many of the most complex problems that
we as a species have to solve. Our interactions with other people
directly impact upon success in inter-personal relationships and
influence many aspects of our lives such as our happiness, our
health, and our success in our job and as a family member. The
capacity to define and implement the correct strategy in a given
social setting is therefore a skill that determines the degree of fit
between individuals and their social environment.
Recent work in psychology and cognitive neuroscience has
highlighted that in daily life cognition is not always gener-
ated from perceptual information. Instead states such as mind-
wandering or daydreaming illustrate that humans have the capac-
ity to self-generate thoughts based on previously-stored informa-
tion rather than events present in the perceptual environment
(Smallwood, 2013). Experience sampling studies suggest that
such self-generated thoughts (SGT) account for fifty percent of
waking thought and content analysis suggests that across cultures
these experiences are mainly focused on the self in the future (e.g.,
Smallwood et al., 2009; Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010; Baird et al.,
2011; Iijima and Tanno, 2012; Song and Wang, 2012), implying
that these episodes may reflect a form of autobiographical plan-
ning (Baird et al., 2011). Despite the high frequency of SGT in
daily life, there is no clear consensus on the purpose that these
experiences may serve. The current experiment examines whether
these states may be related to social problem solving processes.
Successful problem solving depends on two related processes
(D’Zurilla and Goldfried, 1971). The first is a capacity to imag-
ine conditions that would allow the agent to move forward on the
problem, and the second is a capacity to selectively implement
the most effective strategy, a process we will refer to as controlled
processing. Although the capacity for controlled processing can
arguably be common to both self-generated and perceptually
guided thought (Smallwood, 2013) it is possible that the role of
imagination necessary for social problem solving could be specif-
ically related to SGT. For example, the ability to imagine the series
of steps that allow a social problem to be solved and the ability
to self-generate thought both depend on the capacity to imagine
events that are unrelated to the present moment (Frith and Frith,
2006; Smallwood et al., 2012). The main goal of the current study
was to assess whether individual differences in SGT are related
to processes of social problem solving, and if so, whether specific
forms of mental content mediate this relation.
In a large cohort of participants social problem solving was
assessed using the Means-End Problem Solving (MEPS) task,
a validated measure of individuals’ abilities to solve common
everyday social problems (Platt and Spivack, 1975; Marx et al.,
1992; Lyubomirsky and Nolenhoeksema, 1995). The task of the
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participants is to create a story that would allow her/him to
resolve a given problem (e.g., an argument with one’s partner,
making friends in a new neighborhood). The MEPS is used to
assess two distinct aspects of social problem solving: (i) the abil-
ity to generate relevant means (RM) i.e., the number of specific
steps that the participant provides to solve a given problem; (ii)
the overall efficiency of the story, a metric for individuals’ capac-
ity to implement an appropriate and efficient strategy (Marx et al.,
1992).
As the SGT experience varies depending on the context in
which it occurs (for a review, see Smallwood and Andrews-
Hanna, 2013), we measured SGT during two cognitive tasks: (a)
a moderately-demanding Working Memory (WM) task and (b)
a non-demanding Choice Reaction Time task [CRT; for previ-
ous use of these tasks see Smallwood et al. (2011a,b, 2013)]. The
use of two tasks with variable difficulty allows us to manipulate
SGT occurrence and to introduce within-subject variance, as SGT
is routinely reduced in the WM task relative to the CRT task.
Thought-sampling was used to measure participants’ SGT while
they performed these tasks. Participants reported the content of
their thoughts on a number of dimensions: (i) their relevance
to the task being performed, (ii) their temporal focus (future or
past), (iii) their social focus (self- or other-related), and (iv) the
relative level of detail. Finally, task performance was also mea-
sured [response time (RT) and accuracy] and provided a measure
of individuals’ effectiveness at implementing cognition related to
perceptual information.
In this study we were motivated to understand whether pat-
terns of variance in the content of SGT, as well as the conditions
under which they arise provide informative information on the
psychological nature of different types of thought (Smallwood
and Andrews-Hanna, 2013; Smallwood, 2013). The methodolog-
ical approach used in the current study to describe SGT content is
based on our prior published work (Ruby et al., 2013). Using sim-
ilar probe questions, we applied Principal Component Analysis
(PCA) to decompose the probe ratings based on the pattern of
covariance between the reports. This allowed us to define dif-
ferent categories of thoughts based on trial-by-trial changes in
co-variance. Because we apply unconstrained PCA to decompose
our data, this step captures both within-subject and between-
subject sources of variance. Using these PCA components as
dependent variables in subsequent analyses, we next quantify
whether SGT are related to independent variables (such as the
task context in which the measure was taken, or features of the
individual who made the report). As this technique is relatively
novel, we will compare the results obtained using the PCA com-
ponents with results where rating averages were used in a more
standard way. In the discussion we consider in detail the rationale
for employing this approach.
The main goal of the current experiment was to assess how
social problem solving skills are related to individual differences
in SGT. To assess this question we adopted an individual dif-
ference analysis and examined the co-variance between different
elements of MEPS performance and different types of SGT. One
possibility is that SGT, regardless of its content, may be related to
performance on the MEPS. This would be the case if all types of
SGT predicted MEPS performance in a similar way and would
be reflected by a main effect of MEPS. A second possibility is
that only SGT with specific content are related to social problem
solving. This would be the case if our analysis revealed that only
certain types of SGT significantly predict MEPS performance and
would be reflected by an interaction between the specific form
SGT and performance on the MEPS. For example, as social prob-
lem solving is important for anticipating how others may react
in the future it is possible that SGT directed toward the future or
other people may be stronger predictors of MEPS performance
compared to SGT directed toward the self or the past. Finally,
our experimental design also allowed us to assess two subsidiary
questions: (i) the relation between MEPS and cognitive tasks per-
formance and (ii) the link between SGT and performance on the
two cognitive tasks.
METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
The study was part of a broader research project which was
approved by the Ethics Commission of the Medical Faculty of
the University of Leipzig under the code 360-10-13122010. 94
right-handed individuals were recruited from the database of the
Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences,
Leipzig, Germany (Mean age = 29 years, Age range 19–38 years,
49 females). All of them were native German speakers, had nor-
mal or corrected-to-normal vision, no history of psychiatric or
neurological conditions, and no history of substance abuse. Ten
participants were subsequently excluded from the analysis due to
extreme scores on the CRT, the WM, or the MEPS [scores were
considered as extreme when higher than (Q3 + 1.5 × IQR) or
lower than (Q1 – 1.5 × IQR), with Q1 and Q3 the first and third
quartiles, and IQR being the Interquartile Range].
EXPERIMENTAL SESSION
The experimental session lasted 2 h and was divided into
three blocks (block order counterbalanced across subjects).
Participants were allowed to take short breaks between the blocks
if desired. One block consisted of performing the cognitive tasks;
another block consisted of performing the MEPS. A number of
other tasks were measured during the third block and results have
been previously published (Smallwood et al., 2013). All partici-
pants gave written consent before the beginning of the experiment
and were remunerated at least 16 C for their participation (8 C
per hour of participation plus an additional reward according to
their performance during a temporal discounting task). E-prime
2 was used for stimulus presentation (Schneider et al., 2002). All
statistical analyses were performed using R and results were plot-
ted using the ggplot2 package (Wickham, 2009; R Core Team,
2012).
COGNITIVE TASKS
Participants performed two sessions of two cognitive tasks: a
Choice Reaction Time Task (CRT) and a Working Memory Task
[WM; (Smallwood et al., 2009, 2011a,b, 2013)]. Each session
lasted 400 s and participants could take a short break between
sessions if desired. During the CRT task, participants observed
a sequence of black digits on a computer screen while waiting for
a target (a colored digit) to appear, at which point they had to
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indicate the parity of this target (odd or even) with a button push.
In the WM task, participants were exposed to the same sequence
of black digits, and were intermittently probed with a colored
questionmark (“?”).When the questionmark was presented, par-
ticipants had to make a button push to indicate the parity of
the previous digit. Because the occurrence of the colored ques-
tion mark is randomly determined, this task requires participants
to encode and retain in memory the parity of each non-colored
number and make a response only when probed by the ques-
tion mark. In both tasks, black digits were presented for 1000ms
and colored stimuli were presented for 2000ms. Events were sep-
arated by a fixation cross of random duration (2200, 2800, 3200,
or 4400ms). Targets (or question marks) and non-targets were
presented with a ratio of ∼1/6. The average number of targets did
not differ between CRT andWM tasks (mean target number, CRT
task:M = 22.5, SE = 0.4; WM task:M = 22.8, SE = 0.5).
During both the CRT andWM tasks, SGT were recorded using
thought-sampling (average number of probes: CRT task, M =
7.10, SE = 0.2; WM task, M = 7.07, SE = 0.2). Intermittently
throughout the tasks, participants were interrupted and asked
to rate how much their SGT were (i) unrelated to the current
task (i.e., “off-task”); (ii) detailed; (iii) future-focused; (iv) past-
focused; (v) self-focused; and (vi) other-focused. Participants
used Likert scales to answer the probes [1 to 9, a greater score
indicating higher relevance. See Christoff et al. (2009), Mrazek
et al. (2012a) for previous uses of this method].
MEANS END PROBLEM SOLVING TASK
Social problem solving ability was assessed using a modified ver-
sion of the Means-End Problem Solving task [MEPS, (Platt and
Spivack, 1975; Marx et al., 1992)]. The German version of the
task was obtained from Svaldi et al. (2011). Participants read short
scenarios presenting a problem (e.g., “you just moved into a new
neighborhood and you do not know anybody”) and a solution
(e.g., “the story ends when you have several good friends and
you feel at home in the new neighborhood”). The task consists
of creating a story that would allow the participant to reach the
stated solution and therefore solve the problem. Participants are
instructed to be as specific as possible, so that other people read-
ing their story would easily understand how the solution was
achieved. Following Lyubomirsky and Nolenhoeksema (1995)
problems were written using second person pronouns and par-
ticipants were asked to provide a story based on what they would
actually do if they were indeed confronted with such problems.
Four different scenarios were used. Each scenario was presented
on a computer screen and participants had 4min to type in a story
that would link the stated problem to the solution.
Two independent raters coded each story according to two
measures: (i) number of relevant means (RM), representing the
number of discrete steps that would allow the participant to get
closer to the goal; (ii) Efficiency, representing the global efficiency
of the story proposed (how efficient the strategy would actually be
at solving the problem) and rated using a 0 to 7 Likert scale. For
each participant, a mean Efficiency score and a mean RM score
was obtained by averaging the ratings across stories and across
raters (Inter-rater reliability Cronbach’s α, Efficiency: α = 0.79;
for RM: α = 0.79).
RESULTS
DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSES
MEPS performance
Measures obtained during the MEPS were similar to previously-
reported findings [e.g., (Watkins and Baracaia, 2002)]. Mean effi-
ciency was 3.39 (SE = 0.14) and mean RM was 2.68 (SE = 0.11).
Both measures were highly correlated [Pearson’s correlation coef-
ficient (r = 0.72, p < 0.001)]. Measures of MEPS Efficiency and
RM were z-scored prior to performing subsequent analyses.
Task performance
The average Error rate for the CRT task was 0.053 (SE = 0.006)
and for WM task 0.033 (SE = 0.005). The average RT was 799ms
(SE = 13ms) for the CRT task and 759ms (SE = 22ms) for the
WM task. Consistent with previous studies [e.g., (Baird et al.,
2012)], both error rate and RT for correct responses were lower
during the WM compared to the CRT task (paired sample t-test,
Error rate: t = 2.62, p = 0.01, RT: t = 2.25, p < 0.03). This con-
firms that during the WM task, participants were more focused
on the task than during the CRT.
Task modulation of SGT
Off-task ratings were higher in the CRT than theWM task (paired
sample t-test, t = 4.84, p < 0.001). Regarding temporal ques-
tions, a repeated-measures 2 × 2 ANOVA with Task (CRT, WM)
and Probe Question (Future, Past) revealed twomain effects and a
significant interaction (Task: F = 5.13, p = 0.03; ProbeQuestion:
F = 76.54, p < 0.001; Interaction: F = 5.02, p < 0.03). As can be
seen on Figure 1, future ratings were higher than past ratings and
ratings were higher in the CRT compared to the WM task. The
difference in ratings across tasks was especially pronounced for
the Future probes. These results replicate previous findings of a
FIGURE 1 | Mean SGT ratings across mind-wandering (MW) tasks. SGT
in the CRT task were rated as more Off-task, more Self and Other-related,
and more Future-related than SGT in the WM task. In addition, SGT were
overall more future than past-related.
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future bias of SGT that has now been observed in several different
cultures (Smallwood et al., 2009, 2011a; Baird et al., 2011; Iijima
and Tanno, 2012; Song and Wang, 2012). A similar ANOVA was
performed with social questions (Probe Question: Self, Other).
We observed a significant main effect of Task (F = 11.38, p =
0.001) and a trend for an effect of Probe Question (F = 3.01,
p < 0.09). No significant interaction was obtained (F = 1.88,
p = 0.17). This suggests that social-related ratings are higher dur-
ing the CRT compared to the WM task (Figure 1). Finally, we
found no evidence for a difference of detail ratings across tasks
(paired sample t-test, t = −0.89, p > 0.35). Overall, these results
suggest that there is significant within-subject variance present in
thought-probe ratings across cognitive tasks.
LINK BETWEEN SOCIAL PROBLEM SOLVING AND SGT
Decomposition of SGT content
As it can be seen in Table 2, ratings from different probe ques-
tions were highly correlated, suggesting that there is a signifi-
cant amount of shared variance that should be accounted for.
Following Ruby et al. (2013) we used PCA to explore the co-
variance between Off-task ratings and measures of SGT content.
PCA with Varimax rotation was applied on the Off-task, Future,
Past, Self, and Other ratings of 1200 thought probes i.e., regroup-
ing probes from both tasks and all participants. Applying PCA at
the thought-probe level allows to take into account both within-
and between-subject sources of variance and to compute a mea-
sure of the general patterns of SGT that are present in our data.
As our variable of interest is SGT, i.e., “mental content that is
unrelated to the task in hand” (Smallwood, 2013) the off-task
ratings were included in the PCA to appreciate whether the fac-
tors obtained were reflecting on-task or off-task thoughts. The
Detail ratings were excluded from the PCA to replicate the meth-
ods published by Ruby et al. (2013). Two Principal components
were obtained that explained 64% of the variance in our sample
(Figure 2, Table 1). Both components reflected a combination of
social and temporal aspects of SGT: The first socio-temporal com-
ponent loaded positively on Off-task, Future, Self, and Other rat-
ings (hereafter ST-FSO). The second socio-temporal component
loaded positively on Off-task, Past, and Other ratings (hereafter
ST-PO). The pattern of co-variance indicates that other-related
thoughts are prevalent in both past- and future-related SGT
which supports the assumption that both types of SGTmay reflect
attempts at social problem solving.
To take into account the possibility that the context in which
SGT is measured can have implications for SGT’s psychological
correlates, we computed 4 SGT scores for each subject for subse-
quent analyses at the group level: mean ST-FSO in the CRT, mean
ST-FSO in theWM, mean ST-PO in the CRT, and mean ST-PO in
the WM. We performed a 2-by-2 ANOVA with Task (CRT, WM)
and Components (ST-SFO, ST-PO) which revealed a main effect
of Task [F(83) = 18.57, p < 0.001]. This suggests that the ampli-
tude of both components was larger in the CRT than in the WM
task, in a similar manner than the ratings they load on (Figure 3).
A trend for a Task × Component Interaction [F(83) = 3.0, p =
0.087] was also observed. For each component, a difference mea-
sure was computed between CRT and WM tasks and a paired
t-test between these measures revealed a trend for a difference
FIGURE 2 | PCA on SGT ratings revealed two Principal components,
one loading positively on Off-task, Future, Self and Other ratings
(ST-FSO) and one loading positively on Off-task, Past and Other
(ST-PO). PCA with Varimax Rotation was applied on 1200 thought probes
i.e., regrouping probes from both tasks and all participants.
Table 1 | Component loadings obtained from the PCA with Varimax
Rotation on the SGT measures.
ST-FSO ST-PO
Off 0.602 0.555
Other 0.485 0.617
Past −0.115 0.875
Self 0.623 0.106
Future 0.852 −0.041
This information is graphically represented in Figure 2.
across tasks for one component more than the other (t = 1.73,
p = 0.09). Paired t-test for each component indicated that the
difference observed across tasks may be especially pronounced
for ST-FSO (paired t-test for ST-FSO, t = 4.33, p < 0.001; for
ST-PO, t = 1.84, p = 0.07). The results obtained here are very
similar to the results obtained from raw probe data: i.e., all probe
questions had significantly higher ratings in the CRT vs. the WM
task, and future ratings were higher than past ratings, especially
in the CRT task. Our PCA approach therefore yields results that
are consistent with standard group-level averages and replicates
previous findings showing that future-related thinking is higher
during non-demanding vs. demanding tasks.
Link between SGT and MEPS performance
Table 2 shows Pearson’s correlations between probe ratings and
MEPS measures. Although informative, raw correlations do not
take into account the shared variance between measures (e.g.,
the relation between MEPS measures) or the nested structure of
our data (e.g., within-subject sampling across cognitive tasks).
To that end, we favored the use of repeated measures ANOVAs
that allow accounting for within- and between-subjects effects. To
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investigate the link between SGT and MEPS, we first performed
a 2-Way repeated measure ANOVA with Task as a single factor
(CRT vs.WM), predicting Off-task ratings fromMEPS scores. We
observed two main effects (Efficiency: F = 4.60, p < 0.04; RM:
F = 4.04, p < 0.05) but no significant interactions. We therefore
computed a mean Off-task score and ran a linear regression with
Efficiency and RM as covariates. We observed that an increase
in Off-task was negatively correlated with Efficiency (t = −2.13,
FIGURE 3 | Mean SGT Scores across subjects for each Principal
component and each task. SGT scores were higher in the CRT than the
WM task.
p < 0.04) but positively correlated with RM (t = 2.0, p < 0.05).
These results seem to contrast with the raw correlations presented
in Table 2. However, the significant effects may emerge when
applying the ANOVA because both MEPS measures are included
in a single analysis and as a consequence, control for each other.
Our results therefore suggest that only the individual variance of
each measure (rather than their shared variance) has an opposite
relationship with Off-task.
To investigate whether the link between Off-task and MEPS
varies according to SGT content, we performed a repeated mea-
sures 2 × 2 ANOVA (Task: CRT, WM; Components: ST-FSO, ST-
PO) predicting SGT with MEPS measures as between-participant
covariates. We observed main effects for both Efficiency and
RM (Efficiency: F = 7.63, p = 0.007, RM: F = 5.72, p = 0.02)
but no significant interactions, suggesting that MEPS predicted
SGT regardless of content. Separate ANOVAs indicated that
both ST-SFO and ST-PO had similar relations to MEPS per-
formance (ANOVA predicting mean ST-PO score from MEPS
performance, Efficiency: t = −3.19, p = 0.002, RM: t = 3.07,
p = 0.003; ANOVA predicting mean ST-SFO score from MEPS
Performance, Efficiency: t = −1.470, p = 0.14, RM: t = 1.01,
p = 0.3). To visualize the results we computed a mean SGT
score (mean SGT between ST-SFO and ST-PO, across both tasks)
and performed an Univariate ANOVA predicting mean SGT
score again with MEPS scores as covariates. Mean SGT score
was negatively predicted by Efficiency (t = −2.76, p = 0.007)
but positively predicted by RM (t = 2.39, p < 0.02, Figure 4).
Because we applied the PCA on probe ratings at the trial level,
we aim to confirm that this approach did not create artifacts
in our results. Therefore, we computed 2 “pseudo-components”
by averaging the ratings that characterized ST-FSO and ST-PO
(i.e., averaging the probe questions that had a loading coefficient
Table 2 | Correlation matrix for SGT ratings, task performance and MEPS measures.
Efficiency RM RT Error rate Off-task Detail Self Other Future Past
CRT TASK
RT −0.071 −0.089 1.000
Error rate −0.069 −0.094 −0.063 1.000
Off-task −0.052 0.109 0.002 −0.103 1.000
Detail −0.144 −0.261* 0.138 −0.076 0.027 1.000
Self −0.214* −0.166 −0.019 0.141 0.306** 0.107 1.000
Other −0.057 0.157 −0.201+ −0.162 0.694*** 0.073 0.250* 1.000
Future −0.097 0.044 −0.120 −0.155 0.565*** 0.127 0.436*** 0.600*** 1.000
Past −0.136 0.042 −0.028 0.123 0.400*** 0.085 0.338** 0.501** 0.308* 1.000
WM TASK
RT −0.152 −0.196+ 1.000
Error rate −0.334** −0.168 0.262* 1.000
Off−task −0.173 0.058 0.012 0.113 1.000
Detail −0.265* −0.331** 0.242* 0.065 −0.066 1.000
Self −0.117 −0.103 −0.108 0.072 0.447*** −0.035 1.000
Other −0.219* 0.071 −0.105 0.098 0.702*** −0.121 0.266* 1.000
Future −0.052 0.057 −0.107 0.149 0.472*** −0.169 0.379*** 0.531*** 1.000
Past −0.119 0.103 −0.052 −0.007 0.307*** −0.096 0.368*** 0.274* 0.235* 1.000
Significance levels are represented with +(p-value < 0.1), *(p-value < 0.05), **(p-value < 0.01), and ***(p-value < 0.001).
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higher than 0.40). This resulted in two pseudo-components: (i)
pseudo-FSO (average of off-task, other, future and self ratings)
and (ii) pseudo-PO (average of off-task, other and past-ratings).
Each pseudo-component was computed separately for each sub-
ject and each task, therefore only containing within-subject
variance, unlike the group-level PCA components which con-
tain within-subject and between-subject variance. When imple-
menting the 2-by-2 ANOVA with the pseudo-components, we
obtained very similar results [Main effect of Efficiency, F(83) =
7.07, p = 0.009, Main effect of RM, F(83) = 5.32, p = 0.02]. This
confirms that our PCA approach yields results that are consistent
with a standard group level average and did not lead to artificial
results.
LINK BETWEEN SOCIAL PROBLEM SOLVING AND COGNITIVE TASKS
PERFORMANCE
Link between MEPS and CRT/WM performance
In addition to the link between SGT and social problem solv-
ing, our data also allowed us to look at the relationship between
the MEPS and cognitive task performance i.e., whether efficient
problem solvers were also good at performing the CRT and WM
tasks. Pearson’s correlations between MEPS measures and task
performance are reported in Table 2. We computed a measure
of task performance, by averaging Error Rate and RT (previously
z-scored) and reversing the score. This was calculated separately
for the CRT and WM task. We computed a repeated-measures 2-
way ANOVA (Task: CRT, WM) predicting task performance with
Efficiency and RM as covariates. This analysis revealed a trend for
a triple interaction (Task × Efficiency × RM, F = 3.52, p = 0.06)
but no significant main effects (Efficiency, F = 0.67, p > 0.4; RM,
FIGURE 4 | Link between SGT and MEPS performance. Mean SGT was
associated with higher number of RM (left panel) but lower efficiency (right
panel). Mean SGT Score corresponds to the mean of [ST-FSO in CRT,
ST-FSO in WM, ST-PO in CRT, and ST-PO in WM] computed for each
subject. Black lines represent best-fitted linear regressions and gray areas
represent 95% confidence intervals.
F = 0.84, p > 0.3). Separate ANOVAs for each task indicated that
the interaction between Efficiency and RM was almost significant
in the WM task (t = −1.9, p = 0.06) but not in the CRT task
(t = 0.21, p > 0.8). To visualize the interaction, we performed
median splits on both Efficiency and RM and plotted these against
WM task performance. As can be seen on Figure 5, WM perfor-
mance was particularly poor when both Efficiency and RM were
low. Although our result is only at trend level, it suggests that par-
ticipants with poor performance at theWM task, but not the CRT,
also performed poorly on the MEPS.
Shared variance between SGT and cognitive task performance
As both WM task performance and SGT significantly pre-
dicted the MEPS, we investigated whether these two measures
explained shared or separate MEPS variance. We conducted a
repeated measures 2-Way ANOVA predicting MEPS Efficiency
and RM, with WM task performance and mean WM SGT score
as covariates. Both measures still significantly predicted MEPS
performance (Main effect of WM performance, F = 7.32, p =
0.008; WM mean SGT × MEPS interaction, F = 11.05, p =
0.001). Similarly to the previous analysis, WM performance
was associated with poor overall MEPS (Univariate ANOVA
predicting mean MEPS performance, main effect of WM task
performance: t = 2.81, p = 0.006). SGT was associated with
increased RM and reduced Efficiency (Univariate ANOVA for
RM controlling for Efficiency, mean WM SGT: t = 2.81, p =
0.006; Univariate ANOVA for Efficiency controlling for RM,
mean WM SGT: t = −3.34, p = 0.001). This suggests that both
WM performance and SGT explain distinct features of MEPS
variance.
FIGURE 5 | Link between MEPS and WM performance. Participants with
poor WM performance also had poor MEPS performance (low efficiency,
low RM). We performed median splits on Efficiency and RM scores and
computed a measure of mean WM performance for each of the 4 groups of
participants (both low efficiency and RM, both high efficiency and RM, low
efficiency-high RM, high efficiency-low RM). Error bars represent standard
error of the mean.
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LINK BETWEEN SGT AND COGNITIVE TASKS PERFORMANCE
Finally, we investigated the relation between SGT and the
cognitive tasks being performed. To account for the nested
structure of our data, we used a linear mixed model (Bates et al.,
2012) in order to predict performance on each task based on
SGT. p-values were estimated using the pvals.fnc function pro-
vided in the languageR package (Baayen, 2008). ST-PO, ST-FSO,
and Task (CRT, WM) were defined as fixed effects and Subject as
a random effect. We observed a significant positive effect of ST-
FSO on performance (t = 1.99, p < 0.05) whereas ST-PO had no
significant effect (t = −0.59, p > 0.5). In addition, an interac-
tion between Task and ST-FSO was also observed at trend level
(t = −1.88, p = 0.06). ANOVAs performed separately on each
task revealed a trend for an effect of ST-FSO on CRT Performance
(t = 1.84, p < 0.07) but not on WM performance (t = −0.62,
p > 0.5, Figure 6). This suggests that an increase in SGT directed
toward the future, and involving oneself and others, may be asso-
ciated with better task performance, especially during the CRT
task. Again, we confirmed that these resulted were not artifacts
caused by our PCA by performing the linear mixed model again
using the pseudo-components calculated before. The results were
again very similar (Main effect of pseudo-FSO, t = 2.13, p =
0.02;Main Interaction between Task and pseudo-FSO, t = −2.01,
p = 0.04; Effect of pseudo-PO, t = −1.72, p = 0.09; Task ×
pseudo-PO × pseudo-FSO interaction, t = −1.79, p = 0.08).
DISCUSSION
This study sets out to explore the relationship between social
problem solving and SGT. We were interested in examining
whether general SGT levels or specific types of SGT are linked
FIGURE 6 | Link between SGT and cognitive tasks performance. Task
performance was plotted against the ST-FSO Score for each subject,
separately for each cognitive task. Increase in ST-FSO was associated with
increased performance during the CRT task (left panel, p < 0.07) but had no
significant effect in the WM task (right panel). Black lines represent
best-fitted linear regressions and gray areas represent 95% confidence
intervals.
to social problem-solving abilities. To define different types of
SGT, we decomposed our thought-sampling data using PCA at
the trial level, which revealed two components that where dif-
ferentiated by temporal focus (Past vs. Future) and both loaded
strongly on other-related thoughts. This pattern of co-variance
suggests that regardless of temporal focus, SGT often involves
thoughts about other people and so is consistent with the gen-
eral premise that many of these experiences may reflect attempts
at solving social problems. When investigating the link between
SGT and MEPS, we observed that increases in SGT levels, regard-
less of the content, were linked to reduced efficiency but increases
in RM. Our findings therefore do not support the hypothesis that
different types of SGT may have different links to social problem
solving. It is possible that the absence of differentiation between
types of SGT reflects idiosyncratic features of our sample, or a
failure to operationalize the content of SGT in an appropriate
manner. However, as we replicated the finding that future-related
thinking was higher in the non-demanding CRT vs. WM task,
our German sample is broadly similar to groups studied in a
number of different countries (Smallwood et al., 2009; Andrews-
Hanna et al., 2010; Baird et al., 2011; Iijima and Tanno, 2012;
Song and Wang, 2012). Moreover, our finding that ST-FSO (but
not ST-PO) varied with task demands and was associated with
better performance on the CRT task demonstrates that our dif-
ferent measures of content are operationalized sufficiently well as
to be able to differentiate between experimental manipulations
and objective-dependent measures. It seems reasonable to assume
that our failure to find evidence of a clear differentiation between
specific content of SGT and social problem solving cannot there-
fore be explained by unique features of our population or from
a failure to operationalize the content of SGT. Importantly, we
obtained very similar findings when using pseudo-components
computed at the group level, therefore demonstrating that our
results did not arise because of a possible artifact caused by
our PCA approach (see the Limitations section for a complete
discussion of this issue).
Although it remains a possibility that the association between
SGT and social problem solving may depend on the content
of thought if we had operationalized our questions differently,
it is also possible that our results illustrate a general relation-
ship between SGT and social problem solving. Plausibly SGT
and social problem solving share a common dependence on
the capacity to generate mental content that is based on mem-
ory rather than a direct representation of reality as it is now.
This is consistent with accounts of SGT that emphasize that the
unique features of such experiences is the motivated generation
of mental content that are distinct from perception (Smallwood,
2013) and with formulations of problem solving which empha-
size the importance of generative thinking in the production of
novel solution steps. It is also consistent with prior work show-
ing that individuals who engage in daydreaming (as assessed via a
retrospective measure) generate more solutions to creative prob-
lems (Baird et al., 2012). More generally, the positive association
between SGT and RM is consistent with the Current Concerns
Hypothesis proposed by Klinger (1978, 1999). According to this
hypothesis, cognition is often devoted to events that are salient to
individuals, and when the external environment lacks sufficiently
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compelling input, individuals engage in SGT to provide a source
of stimulation. As the Current Concerns Hypothesis assumes that
the motivating feature for SGT is an attempt to resolve personal
concerns, it elegantly captures our finding that individuals who
habitually engage in SGT generate more RM in order to solve the
MEPS problems.
Not only was SGT associated with more RM, it was also asso-
ciated with a reduction in the effectiveness of the solutions, as
judged by our independent raters. One interpretation of this
result is that the relation between SGT and social problem solving
may take the form of a Yerkes-Dodson relationship, with opti-
mal problem solving being achieved by individuals who display a
suitable balance between SGT and cognition derived from percep-
tual input. Plausibly, there may be three different populations of
problem-solvers: one who generates low levels of SGT and pro-
duces short but efficient solutions to problems, a second who
produces large numbers of solutions with reasonable levels of
efficiency and a third who generates the most steps but whose
solutions are ineffective. Although speculative, this interpreta-
tion of our data is consistent with evidence that SGT can have
both costs and benefits to tasks performance (for a review, see
Smallwood, 2013). Moreover, it suggests a reason why interven-
tions that cultivate mindfulness and which reduce the tendency
for mind-wandering (Mrazek et al., 2012b, 2013) may be bene-
ficial in daily life. By restraining the mind’s habitual tendency to
wander, interventions that emphasize being in the moment may
help individuals gain a degree of control over SGT which may
in turn allow them to employ this basic capacity for conscious
thought to generate solutions in a more efficient manner.
We also found that participants with poor problem solving
abilities (characterized by both low RM and Efficiency) per-
formed poorly on a moderately demanding WM task when
controlling for SGT. As the WM task relies on greater controlled
processing than does the CRT, this suggests that the capacity to
deploy controlled processing to an external task and to social
problem solving relies on similar cognitive processes (such as
working memory or attentional resources). This is consistent
with prior studies that have demonstrated that individuals high
on measures of controlled processing are also good problem
solvers, as well as fMRI investigations which link domain general
processes of control to the solution of both spatial and autobio-
graphical problems (Spreng et al., 2010). Finally, a positive link
between SGT and task performance was in particular observed
during the non-demanding CRT task and may reflect the find-
ing that future-related thought in the CRT is linked to higher
working memory (Baird et al., 2011). Our result of better perfor-
mance associated with ST-FSO is in contrast to other studies that
find that in general, experience unrelated to a task elicits a nega-
tive influence on task performance (for a review, see Smallwood,
2011). This result suggests that future studies understanding the
negative influence of SGT on task performance should take in
account both task context as well as the content of thoughts
(Smallwood and Andrews-Hanna, 2013).
LIMITATIONS
The overarching framework guiding the current study is
the hypothesis that meaningful psychological information is
contained in the variation in SGT content across situations and
individuals (Smallwood and Andrews-Hanna, 2013). As a con-
sequence, we sought to define categories of SGT that have the
potential to simultaneously vary within and between participants.
We applied unconstrained PCA at the trial level and examined
how the resultant components varied in a quantitative fashion
across individuals and situations. This novel approach allowed
us to investigate three types of psychological relationships to
SGT: (i) possible within-subjects effects on the SGT content (e.g.,
“Does SGT vary depending on the task?”), (ii) between-subject
effects (e.g., “Does SGT content vary according to MEPS perfor-
mance?”), and (iii) their interaction (e.g., “Do certain individuals
exhibit different patterns of thoughts in different contexts?”).
Given the novelty of our data analysis strategy, it is worth explic-
itly considering its strengths and weaknesses.
One practical question is whether our approach yields results
that are either unreliable or inconsistent with what is known
about SGT: this would provide straightforward evidence that
this approach lacks utility. In terms of replicability, the PCA
components we obtained in the current study have a striking
resemblance to previously published SGT components obtained
from an independent dataset (Ruby et al., 2013). This consis-
tency across datasets suggests that the components obtained from
an unconstrained trial-level PCA are reasonably replicable. Our
work using the trial-by-trial PCA also found results consistent
with previous findings in the SGT literature. In terms of within-
participant variance, ST-FSO was higher in a non-demanding
task: this is consistent with a prospective bias to SGT found by
several different laboratories (Smallwood et al., 2009; Andrews-
Hanna et al., 2010; Baird et al., 2011; Iijima and Tanno, 2012;
Song and Wang, 2012). Our PCA approach also yielded group-
level effects that have been demonstrated by prior studies. Ruby
and colleagues reported that ST-PO is linked to higher BDI score
(Ruby et al., 2013), an observation that is consistent with the
increased retrospective focus found in dysphoria and unhap-
piness (Smallwood and O’Connor, 2011; Poerio et al., 2013;
Stawarczyk et al., 2013). The application of PCA at the trial level
therefore captures both within and between-participant variation
consistent with other methods of analysis. Altogether this sug-
gests that trial level PCA can yield reliable results that are both
replicable and are consistent with prior work.
There are also theoretical questions regarding how to best
decompose SGT in order to characterize the psychological corre-
lates of the within and between-participant variance in thought
content [for a review see (Smallwood, 2013; Smallwood and
Andrews-Hanna, 2013)]. Dimension reduction techniques can
be employed that control for both within and between-subject
variance during data decomposition e.g., multi-level exploratory
factor analysis (Reise et al., 2005). These provide a more gener-
alizable description of the thoughts of the population because
they seek covariance that is common across the sample (or to
a particular context). However, these techniques make catego-
rizing variation across individuals, or contexts, more difficult,
because by optimizing the decomposition process to seek com-
monality, differences across people or context are a feature of
the unexplained variance. As we are interested in describing the
psychological significance of the co-variance between and within
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participants, we did not want to constrain the decomposition
process using this information. Instead, we tested the psycholog-
ical features of within and between-participant variance derived
from our unconstrained PCA by including the individual and
context as factors in subsequent analyses. Our demonstration
that ST-FSO was higher in the CRT task (i.e., within-participant
variance) for individuals who performed the task especially well
(i.e., between-participant variance, see Figure 6) indicates that
we were successful in this regard. Although the specific features
of SGT that we find using trial-by-trial PCA may not general-
ize to other samples, this result demonstrates that co-variance
across both tasks and participants provide meaningful psycholog-
ical information regarding the content of thought (Smallwood,
2013; Smallwood and Andrews-Hanna, 2013). A second alterna-
tive would be to employ PCA separately to each task at the group
level; this would allow an investigation of qualitative differences
in PCA structure in different contexts; however, it would make it
impossible to quantify how specific patterns of thought change
across situations because the PCA components calculated in this
fashion would not be directly comparable. While the possibility
remains that the application of PCA at the trial level could lead
to unrepresentative results, the available data suggests that the
technique yields results that are (i) reliable across independent
data sets, (ii) provides valid accounts of existing phenomena, (iii)
captures psychological differences that are contained in the pat-
terns of covariance in multiple reports of SGT, and (iv) allows
the quantitative capture of both within and between-subject co-
variation in different aspects of SGT. We suggest that future
research should continue to use this technique in an exploratory
fashion because of its potential value in mapping the heterogene-
ity of SGT that arises through the combination of the constraints
placed by different environmental situations and the range of
individual differences that contribute to the content of thought.
There are a number of further limitations that should be borne
in mind when considering our data. Concerning our method-
ological approach, we only administered a measure of social prob-
lem solving and it remains to be seen whether the link between
problem solving and control processes or SGT is specific to the
social domain or may generalize to other forms of problem res-
olution. In addition, although problems were chosen to mimic
daily-life concerns, they remain hypothetical. Anderson et al.
(2009) compared measures of problem solving abilities obtained
from theMEPS and from a “Real-Life problem solving diary task,”
in which participants’ reported a problem when it occurs and
describe afterwards the strategy they used to solve it. Although
they found that the performance at both tasks could predict
future depressive symptoms, they also observed that both mea-
sures explained different portions of variance and did not corre-
late. This suggests that, although the MEPS remains an important
tool as it measures the ability to generate responses to problems
under laboratory conditions, Anderson notes that “it is the suc-
cessful implementation of such strategies that ultimately impacts
upon the situation’s outcome” [p. 54 (Anderson et al., 2009)].
Although our data suggests that individuals reporting more SGT
may also have improved problem solving skills, it does not allow
us to draw conclusions regarding their actual success in daily life.
Our data is also correlational and though our results confirm
links between social problem solving and SGT, we cannot iden-
tify whether fluency at social problem causes SGT or vice versa,
nor can we specify the mechanism that links these two phenom-
ena without further study. Based on studies showing a positive
relation betweenMEPS performance and autobiographical mem-
ory retrieval [e.g., (Evans et al., 1992; Goddard et al., 1996, 1997)]
and the link between SGT and autobiographical memory (Baird
et al., 2011; Smallwood, 2013), the association between SGT
and social problem solving may emerge through their mutual
requirement of autobiographical memory. One important future
direction would therefore be to assess memory capacities or to use
neuroimaging methods to determine the specific cognitive pro-
cesses that mediate the link between social problem solving skills
and SGT [e.g., (Spreng et al., 2010)]. Given that social problem
solving is important to the success of every member of soci-
ety, understanding the mechanism that links this experience to
states of perceptually-guided thought and particularly SGT are
recommended.
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